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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(4) and 78A-4-103(2)(j).
COUNTER STATEMENT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Defendants hereby submit their Counter Statement to the issues on appeal.
The reason for offering the counter statement is the BV Entities' suggestion that
determining whether a party has standing requires the district court to consider evidence
of the BV Entities' claims. However, questions of standing "arise early in the litigation,
usually before discovery and the introduction of evidence." Utah Chapter of the Sierra
Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 960 *{ 28, n.3. Accordingly,
Defendants assert that the issues on appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the district court correctly dismiss BV Lending, LLC ("BV Lending")

on the grounds that it lacked traditional standing to contest the Assessment Ordinance
because it transferred ownership of the certain real property to BV Jordanelle, LLC ("BV
Jordanelle") in November 2009, thereby eliminating any stake it may have in the
outcome of the proceedings since the assessment lien does not follow BV Lending as a
personal obligation?
2.

Did the district court correctly dismiss BV Jordanelle on the grounds that it

lacked traditional standing to contest the Assessment Ordinance because it was not
formed as a legal entity until October 29, 2009, did not exist as a legal entity, and
acquired the property after the Assessment Ordinance, notice of the assessment, and the
assessment lien were matters of public record?

nMWPQ-raansnnna wa
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3.

Did the district court correctly conclude that BV Jordanelle did not have

traditional standing to contest the constitutional rights of BV Lending regarding the
Assessment Ordinance because B V Lending did not transfer to B V Jordanelle any
interest in the First Note, Second Note, or the Deed of Trust because BV Lending made a
credit bid at the trustee's sale leaving no such interest to transfer?
4.

Did the district court correctly conclude that BV Lending lacks alternative

standing to contest the Assessment Ordinance because it has no obligation to pay the
assessment and the case does not present issues of sufficient public importance?
5.

Did the district court correctly conclude that BV Jordanelle lacks

alternative standing to contest the Assessment Ordinance because this case does not
present issues of sufficient importance to balance the absence of traditional standing
criteria?
The foregoing issues should be reviewed for correctness. Mellon v. Wasatch Crest
Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, t 7, 201 P.3d 1004. The issues were preserved below by
Plaintiffs opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (R. 1808) and Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certification. (R. 1903.)
COUNTER STATEMENT TO DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Although BV Lending and BV Jordanelle (collectively the "BV Entities") have
directed the Court to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, none of
these constitutional provisions are determinative. The fundamental question is whether

DMWEST #9050009 v9
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the BV Entities have standing to pursue their constitutional claims. The Defendants
recognize that one the most fundamental rights we have as a citizenry is the right to due
process. Yet, equally fundamental is that a party must have standing to pursue such
rights. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, If 23. It is standing that lies at the
heart of this appeal. In that vein, only Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-106 (2007), a copy of
which is attached the Appellant's Brief as Addendum 3, is determinative in this case.
COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case and Procedural Posture
This is an appeal from the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part,
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, whereby the district court dismissed the BV Entities'
first, second, and third causes of action on the grounds that the BV Entities lacked
standing to pursue their constitutional claims.1
The BV Entities' motives are clear upon examination of the procedural and factual
history of this case. Using the United States and Utah Constitutions as their bully pulpit,
the B V Entities filed suit against the Defendants seeking to avoid a scheduled foreclosure
sale on certain real property securing an assessment lien properly established by Wasatch
County in accordance with the Utah Assessment Area Act (the "Act"). The BV Entities
claim their constitutional rights to due process were violated when they failed to receive
"actual notice" of the adoption of the Assessment Ordinance.

The district court also dismissed the fourth cause of action, which is not an
issue in this appeal.

H M I A / C O T 4tCkr\cr\nnr\ ..n
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After securing a temporary restraining order, two days later, BV Jordanelle sought
bankruptcy protection and immediately removed this case to the United States
Bankruptcy Court in the District of Utah (the "Bankruptcy Court"). When the
Bankruptcy Court indicated its inclination to abstain from hearing the case due to the
overwhelming presence of state law issues, the parties stipulated to the Bankruptcy
Court's abstention and transferred the case back to the district court.
With the case back before the district court, Defendants moved to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"). Central to this effort was whether the BV
Entities had subject matter jurisdiction or standing. They did not and do not. Although
the district court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the BV
Entities' constitutional claims, section 11-42-106 of the Act provides the exclusive
remedy to contest both the establishment of an "assessment area" and "assessment lien."
Specifically, it provides that a "person who contests an assessment or any proceeding to
designate an assessment area or levy" shall file an action not "more than 30 days after the
effective date of the assessment resolution of ordinance ... ." Utah Code Ann. § 11-42106. Here, it is undisputed that the applicable assessment ordinance (hereinafter
"Assessment Ordinance") became effective on August 14, 2009. The BV Entities did not
file their complaint until August 30, 2010, over a year after the Assessment Ordinance
became effective and over eight (8) months after they admittedly learned of the
assessment lien. Subsection 106(5) expressly states, "[ajfter the expiration of the 30-day
period referred to in subsection (2)(b)," "a suit to enjoin, ... or to attack or question in
any way the legality of assessment bonds, ... or an assessment may not be commenced,

DMWEST #9050009 v9
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and a court may not inquire into those matters." Id. at § 11-42-106(5). Accordingly, the
district court had no jurisdiction to even consider the claims asserted by the BV Entities.
Regardless, the district court correctly dismissed BV Entities' first, second, and
third claims because the BV Entities lack the requisite standing to assert their claims. At
the heart of the BV Entities' constitutional claims is the Defendants' purported failure to
provide notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the action being taken
to approve the Assessment Ordinance. However, the BV Entities openly admit that
Wasatch County and the Defendants satisfied all statutory notice requirements including
publishing notice of the creation of the Assessment Area in 2005 and Assessment
Ordinance in the summer of 2009. It is further undisputed that when BV Lending
purchased the property (pledged by its borrower, PWJ Holdings, LLC), via a trustee's
sale on October 29, 2009, the assessment lien to which the BV Entities now object v/as a
matter of public record, having been recorded in September of 2009. As such, the BV
Entities took title subject to the Assessment Ordinance and lien and have no standing to
assert there was an "error or irregularity" in the adoption of the Assessment Ordinance.3

As discussed further below, in affirming the Order of the district court
appealed from, this Court may sustain the judgment on any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record. See In re T.E., 2011 UT 51,136. ("It is well settled that 'an
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record.'").
The adoption of the Assessment Ordinance is the second step in a two step
process established by the Utah Legislature for allowing local governmental entities, with
the input, consent and participation of property owners, to establish special service
districts to build and construct infrastructure for development. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 11-42-201- 208; 11-42-401- 416.
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Any right to object to and/or commence an action contesting the "levy [of] an
assessment" had to be brought within thirty (30) days "after the effective date of the
assessment resolution or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-106. Since this action
was commenced over a year after the Assessment Ordinance was established, there is no
justiciable controversy. Therefore, the district court correctly ruled that the BV Entities
have no standing to pursue the claims.
In dismissing the BV Entities' constitutional due process claims, the district court
held they lacked traditional and alternative standing. BV Lending lacked traditional
standing, the district court concluded, because "B VL no longer has a security interest or
ownership interest in the property, having transferred ownership of the property to BVJ in
November, 2009." (R. 1892.) By divesting itself of any interest in the property, "BVL
eliminated any stake it may have had in the outcome of the[] proceedings and the relief
sought, especially since the assessment lien does not follow BVL as a personal
obligation." (Id.) Likewise, BV Jordanelle lacked traditional standing, the district court
concluded, because it was not even established until October 29, 2009, and when "BVJ
acquired the property, the assessment ordinance, notice of assessment, and assessment
lien were all matters of public record." (R. 1891.) Thus, "the adoption of the assessment
ordinance, notice of assessment, and assessment lien did not cause injury to BVJ's
interest in the property." (Id.) Further, the district court rejected the BV Entities' claim
that they collectively have the right to pursue their claims by concluding "BVJ cannot
litigate the rights of BVL in this action." (Id. (emphasis added).) The reason was
because BV Lending "did not transfer to BVJ any interest in the First Note, Second Note
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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or Deed of Trust," due to BV Lending having "made a full credit bid at the trustee's
sale." Accordingly, no such interest remained to transfer. (Id.)
The district court also held that the BV Entities lacked alternative standing.
Again, because B VL retained no "current interest," it has no stake in the outcome. As the
district court correctly held, "[t]o maintain standing to prosecute the claims in this case, a
party must retain some interest - whether a security interest or ownership interest - in the
property subject to the assessment ordinance." (R. 1890.) BV Lending had neither.
Focusing on the second aspect of alternative standing, whether the case presents issues of
sufficient public importance, the district court concluded that while the case impacts the
rights of private property owners, "it does not present issues of sufficient public
importance to balance the absence of traditional standing criteria." (R. 1889.)
Accordingly, it held BV Lending and BV Jordanelle lacked alternative standing because
unlike Grantsville v. RDA, 2010 UT 38, Cedar Mountain Environmental Inc. v. Tooele
County, 2009 UT 48, and Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, "a public interest
of equal weight is not at stake here." (R. 1890.)
Here, the very property owners who sought and invited Defendants to create the
District, and to construct and install $50 million in improvements, directly benefit from
these improvements. Those property owners did not oppose the adoption of the
Assessment Ordinance in accordance with Utah law, and they cannot now be heard to
complain. Nor can the lenders and/or subsequent purchasers be heard to complain since
they acquired title to the subject property after the passage of the Assessment Ordinance
of which they had actual or constructive knowledge.
r M i i * i r f » T iirirtFrtftftn . . «
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Counter Statement of the Facts
As the district court noted, the facts in this case are generally undisputed.
(R. 1979 at 124:8-10.) The only possible exception relates to whether BV Lending was
on actual as opposed to constructive notice of the Creation Resolution. However, notice
has no bearing on whether B V Lending has standing to contest the Assessment
Ordinance, having sold its interest in the assessed property. Notice has even less bearing
on whether B V Jordanelle has standing to pursue its claims when it did not even exist as
an entity when the Assessment Ordinance was adopted.
A.

The Parties,
1.

BV Lending, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal

place of business in Idaho Falls, Idaho. (R. 1393 atf 1.)
2.

BV Jordanelle, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal

place of business in Idaho Falls, Idaho that was established on October 29, 2009. (Id. at
1f2.)

..; , ." •
3.

Defendant Jordanelle Special Service District ("JSSD") is a special service

district, as that term is defined and used in the Utah Special Sendee District Act, created
by Wasatch County. ( M a t If 6.)
4.

Defendant Jordanelle Special Service District, Utah Special Improvement

District No. 2005-2 (the "District") is a county improvement district created in 2006 by
Resolution 2006-4 of the Wasatch County Council acting as the governing board of JSSD
pursuant to the Utah County Improvement District Act. (R. 1392 at f 7.)

DMWEST #9nsnnnQ VQ
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5.

Defendant W. Jeffery Fillmore ("Fillmore") is an attorney and resident of

Salt Lake County appointed by JSSD as the foreclosure trustee of the District for the
purpose of foreclosing upon certain assessment liens which Defendants assert encumber
the BV Entities' real property pursuant to that certain Ordinance No. 09-10 adopted by
the Wasatch County Council acting as the governing board of JSSD on July 8, 2009.
B.

Wasatch County Establishes Special Service District and Constructs
Improvements in Accordance with Creation Resolution,
6.

On or about October 19, 2005, the Wasatch County Council adopted a

Notice of Intention to create the Jordanelle Special Service District, Utah Special
Improvement District No. 2005-2. (First Amended Complaint, January 12, 2011
(R. 1392 at 1f 13.)
(a)

Pursuant to the Notice of Intention, (R. 1678-1694) the Governing

Authority (i.e. Wasatch County) disclosed that the "method by which the
assessments are to be levied shall be according to 'equivalent residential units'"
(or"ERU"). (R. 1690.)
(b)

The Notice of Intention further revealed and identified "all

Properties within the Improvement District" including property owned by
"Aspens" and designated that the "Aspens" property would have a total of 1,384
ERU's. (SeeR. 1689.)
(c)

The Notice of Intention further provided an estimated cost of

improvements to be constructed for the benefit of the property owner's listed
therein and the estimated assessment cost per ERU. (Id.)

D M W F S TtfQnsnnnc)MQ
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7.

In February 2006, the Wasatch County Council unanimously passed the

Creation Resolution, (R. 1391), which resolution was recorded in the Wasatch County
Recorder's Office on February 17, 2006 as Entry No. 297016, in Book 830, at Pages 532561, against the real property impacted by the Creation Resolution. (R. 1391 atfflf1415.)
8.

The Creation Resolution was recorded against the "Aspens" property,

which at the time was owned by PWJ Holdings, LLC ("PWJ Holdings") and/or its
predecessor (the "Aspens Parcel"). (Id at 116; R. 1649-1676.)
9.

The Minutes of the February, 15, 2006 Wasatch County Council meeting,

which was duly noticed and called to order, revealed the following:
(a)

The Notice of Intention was published in the Wasatch Wave, a

newspaper of general circulation in the Special Service District four times, once
during each week for four consecutive weeks with the last publication being not
less than five (5) nor more than twenty (20) days prior to November 23, 2005.
(SeeR. 1676.)
(b)

The Notice of Intention was mailed to each owner of land affected

by or specially benefited by such improvements as said property was described in
the Notice. (R. 1675-1676.)
(c)

The Protest Hearing was held on November 23, 2005. (R. 1675.)

(d)

No written protests against the creation of the District were received,

nor were any verbal protests presented at the Protest Hearing. (Id.)

DMWEST #9050009 v9
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10.

After the creation of the District, certain bonds were issued to cover the

costs of the improvements and the District caused the improvements to be constructed.
(R. 1741 at If 5.)
C.

BV Lending Extends Credit to PWJ Holdings.
11.

In March 2008, BV Lending made two loans to PWJ Holdings in the

amounts of $4,232,804.00 and $2,116,402.00, respectively. The loans were evidenced by
two notes (the "First and Second Notes") and secured by a Deed of Trust dated March 31,
2008, which Deed of Trust was recorded in the Wasatch County Recorder's Office as
Entry no. 334115, in Book 0963, at Pages 2246-54 (the "BV Lending Deed"). (R. 13901391 atffl[18-21.)
12.

The BV Lending Deed was recorded against approximately 700 acres of the

Aspens Parcel (the "BV Property") owned by PWJ Holdings through a metes and bounds
description. (R. 1390 at ^f 23.) The collateral pledged to secure the First and Second
Notes was not improved or subdivided. (R. 1541-1543.)
13.

When the BV Lending Deed was recorded, the Creation Resolution was a

matter of public record. (R. 1649-1676.)
14.

On or about February 10,2009, PWJ Holdings, LLC filed a bankruptcy

petition under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, Bk. No. 09-21044 JAB (the "PWJ Bankruptcy
Case"). (R. 1639-1646.)
15.

On or about February 11, 2009, B V Lending filed a Notice of Appearance

and Request for Notice in the PWJ Bankruptcy Case. (R. 1635-1637.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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16.

On or about May 11, 20095 PWJ Holdings filed a Disclosure Statement to

Accompany Plan of Reorganization Proposed by the BV Jordanelle Dated May 11, 2009,
(R. 1556-1633) wherein it disclosed (a) the existence of the District and (b) the existence
of JSSD's secured claim arising out of the Assessment Ordinance. Specifically, PWJ
Holdings disclosed the following:
Prior to the Petition Date, the Jordanelle Special Services
District ("JSSD") approved the issuance of an infrastructure bond in
the amount of $44.21 million. The secured claims of the JSSD arise
out of and in connection with the Assessment Ordinance. The
Debtor believes that the bonds are allocated to the Project on the
basis of approximately $ 12,850 per Equivalent Residential Unit
("ERU") within the JSSD. The Project currently has approval for
1,384 ERU's. The Debtor is not certain of the exact amount of the
obligation or when the obligation to pay interest or principal on the
bonds may begin.
(SeeR. 1609.) BV Lending received a copy of the Disclosure Statement. (R. 16351637.)
D.

Wasatch County Adopts Assessment Ordinance.
17.

On June 23, 2009, the Wasatch County Council recorded a Notice of

Proposed Assessment against the Aspens Parcel including the B V Property and all other
property within the District. (R. 1389 at f 29.)
18.

On July 8, 2009, the Wasatch County Council, as the governing board of

JSSD, adopted an Assessment Ordinance levying an assessment against the Aspens
Parcel, including the BV Property. Section 12 of the Assessment Ordinance provided
that any party may challenge the Assessment Ordinance "not later than thirty (30) days
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after the effective date of the Ordinance. This action shall be the exclusive remedy of
any aggrieved party." (R. 1385 at ^ 38.h.)
(a)

Section 13 provided that written notice of the Assessment Ordinance

would be provided to "the property owners in the District." (Id. at ^ 38.L)
(b)

Section 17 provided that the Ordinance "shall be published in the

Wasatch Wave, a newspaper published and having general circulation in the
county, and shall take immediately upon its passage and approval and publication
as required by law." (R. 1384-1385 at t 38.j.)
19.

The BV Entities do not allege or dispute that the District and Wasatch

County gave notice of the Assessment Ordinance in accordance with the Act, Utah law,
and the terms of the Assessment Ordinance. (R 1385 at ^ 39.)
20.

The Assessment Ordinance became effective on July 15, 2009. (Id. at

Tf 40.) Thus, the thirty (30) day period for challenging the Assessment Ordinance expired
on August 14, 2009. (Id.) No objections were filed by any of the affected property
owners within the District or any other party, including but not limited to lenders whose
loans had been secured by property within the District.
21.

On September 24, 2009, the District caused a Notice of Assessment Interest

to be recorded in the Wasatch County Recorder's Office, as Entry 352632, in Book 1000,
at Pages 1569-1583. (R. 1540-1554.) The Notice of Assessment Interest expressly
provided that:
Notice is hereby given that [JSSDJ, claims an interest in the
property described in Exhibit 1 arising out of the [District] and the
terms and provisions of the Assessment Ordinance adopted by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Wasatch County Council as the governing body ofJSSD on July 8,
2009, levying an assessment against certain properties in the
District.
(R. 1554.)
22.

The properties levied included the Aspens Parcel and the BV Property.

(R. 1381 at If 50.) The public was put on notice by the District's recording of the Notice
of Assessment Interest. (Id.)
E.

BV Lending Purchases the BV Property and Immediately Transfers the BV
Property to BV Jordanelle.
23.

Upon securing relief from the automatic stay in the PWJ Bankruptcy Case,

BV Lending directed the trustee to schedule a trustee's sale of the BV Property, which
sale was held on or about October 29, 2009 over a month after the Notice of Assessment
Ordinance was recorded against the BV Property. (R. 1381 at TJ 54.)
24.

BV Lending voluntarily bid and was the successful bidder at the trustee's

sale by making a credit bid of $8,684,279.65 representing the amounts owed under the
First and Second Notes. (A/.,f56.)
25.

BV Lending was under no obligation to purchase the BV Property or make

a credit bid for the full amount due and owing by PWJ Holdings.
26.

On October 29, 2009, the day of the trustee's sale, BV Jordanelle was

created when it filed Articles of Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State.
(R. 1538.)
27.

Shortly after the trustee's sale, on November 10, 2009 BV Lending

assigned and conveyed all of its right title and interest in the BV Property to BV

DMWEST #9050009 v9
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Jordanelle. (R. 1381 at ^ 57; see also Trustee's Deed evidencing the transfer from BV
Lending to BV Jordanelle which was recorded in the Wasatch County Recorder's Office
on November 10, 2009, as Entry 354092, in Book 1004, at Pages 187-192 (R. 15301535.)
28.

Significantly, the Trustee's Deed given to BV Jordanelle expressly states

the transfer is "without any covenant or warranty of any kind, express or implied."
(R. 1532.)
29.

Based on the Trustee's Deed, BV Lending has no interest in the BV

Property, and BV Jordanelle accepted fee simple title to the BV Property subject to the
Assessment Ordinance and Notice of Assessment Interest. (Id.)
30.

The Assessment Ordinance and Notice of Assessment Interest were

recorded and were a matter of public record prior to the time BV Jordanelle received its
interest in the BV Property. (R. 1540-1554.)
F.

The District Seeks Payment of Assessments.
31.

On November 1, 2009, the District sent notice to all property owners of

record within the District, including PWJ Holdings, in accordance with the Assessment
Ordinance and Utah law. (R. 1736 n.7.)
32.

Notice was not sent to BV Jordanelle because title had not passed since it

was not until November 10, 2009 that the trustee's deed conveying title was recorded
with the Wasatch County Recorder's Office. (R. 1530-1535.)
33.

No payment was received on February 1, 2010 from any owner of the

Aspens Parcel, including BV Jordanelle. (R. 1523-1525.)
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34.

At page xiv, paragraph 28, footnote 1, of the Appellants' brief, the BV

Entities call attention to the accelerated balance due and owing to the District due to the
non-payment of the assessment by all owners of the Aspens Parcel. For some time, there
was confusion over precisely what portion of the Aspens Parcel BV Jordanelle owned.
The confusion lies between what BV Jordanelle claimed it owned and what Wasatch
County showed was owned by BV Jordanelle. BV Jordanelle and the District have
determined with reasonable certainty what BV Jordanelle owns. BV Jordanelle owns a
portion of the Aspens Parcel consisting of over 1,500 acres assigned 1384 equivalent
residential units.4
G.

BV Jordanelle Defaults on Its Obligations Pursuant to the Assessment
35.

It is undisputed that the District has an assessment lien against the Aspens

Parcel, including the BV Property, which lien was not extinguished by BV Lending's
trustee's sale on October 29, 2009. (R. 1737 at 126.)
36.

It is also undisputed that the BV Entities purportedly discovered the

existence of the Assessment Ordinance and Notice of Assessment Interest in January,
2010.5 (R. 1382 at 1f 49.)

At the time of the adoption of the Assessment Ordinance, a portion of the
Aspens Parcel had been subdivided into 71 lots and/or ERU's. (R. 1473.) Except for the
Talisman Plat 1 subdivision, the balance of the Aspens Parcel had not been subdivided.
(R. 1474-1476.)
5

Defendants affirmatively assert the BV Entities had notice constructive of the
Assessment Ordinance as early as May of 2009 when PWJ Holdings filed the Disclosure
Statement, or at the very least when the Assessment Ordinance was recorded.
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37.

On or about February 23, 2010, the District sent written notices to BV

Jordanelle regarding the Assessment Ordinance and Notice of Assessment Interest,
informing it that the first installment was due February 1, 2010 and that BV Jordanelle
was in default for failure to make the first required installment payment in accordance
with the Notice of Assessment Interest recorded on September 24, 2009. (R. 1380 at
161.)
38.

Between February 2010 and April 2010, BV Jordanelle failed to make any

payment due on the assessment, despite its knowledge that such payments were due and
owing. (R. 1523-1525.)
39.

On or about April 16, 2010, the District sent, and BV Jordanelle received a

Designation of Trustee and Notice of Default and Election to Sell ("Notice of Default")
regarding the BV Property. The Notice informed Plaintiffs of their default and that
because the assessment was not paid, the total unpaid balance for the principal of the
Assessment owing has been accelerated and was due and payable. (See Notice of
Default, R. 1523-1525.)
40.

BV Jordanelle failed to pay any portion of the amount due and owing to the

District pursuant to the assessment within 90 days after the recording of the Notice of
Default.
41.

As such, on August 3, 2010, the District directed Fillmore, to send BV

Jordanelle a Notice of Trustee's Sale, (R. 1520-1521), informing BV Jordanelle that on
September 1, 2010, the BV Property would be sold to satisfy BV Jordanelle's obligations
for the assessments on the BV Property.
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H.

BV Jordanelle and BV Lending File Action and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order Seeking to Enjoin Trustee's Sale,
42.

On August 30, 2010, despite having learned of the Assessment Ordinance

in January 2010, the BV Entities filed their initial complaint seeking to enjoin the
foreclosure sale of the BV Property.
43.

The Complaint asserts six separate causes of action. The first three causes

of action challenge the constitutionality of the Act, and specifically Utah Code Ann. §1142-106, by alleging that the Act violates the United States and Utah Constitutions by
denying BV Lending of its due process rights to notice because the Act does not require
that actual notice be provided to a recorded lienholder. Specifically, the Complaint
asserts the following causes of action:
(a)

Declaratory Relief for violation of the Due Process Clause, seeking

declaratory relief that the Assessment Ordinance, the Notice of Assessment
Interest, and the accompanying assessment lien deprived Plaintiffs of their
property interests without due process of law in violation of the U.S. and Utah
Constitutions. (R. 1368-1372 atfflf97-115);
(b)

Declaratory Relief for violation of the Open Courts Clause, seeking

declaratory judgment that the Utah Assessment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-42106(2)(b) is unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution as applied to
beneficiaries of deeds of trust. (R. 1366-1368 atffif116-123);
(c)

Declaratory Relief- Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment and Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution,

niv/i\A/F<rr aan^nnna wQ
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seeking declaratory judgment that the method of assessment used by JSSD and the
District to assess the BV Property was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Utah
Constitutions, and is therefore null and void. (R. 1363-1366 atfflj124-137);
(d)

Declaratory Relief- Assessment Lien Void as to the BV Property

because it was imposed in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay, seeking
declaratory judgment that, to the extent JSSD and the District were barred by the
automatic bankruptcy stay from imposing a lien on the BV Property, the lien they
seek to foreclose is void. (R. 1360-1363 atffif 138-153);
(e)

Declaratory Relief- Various Matters Relating to Defendants' Alleged

Lien and Claim, seeking declaratory relief with respect to the following issues:
(1) whether JSSD and the District have a valid and enforceable lien and whether
the lien encumbers all of the BV Property or a portion of it; (2) assuming JSSD
and the District have a valid and enforceable lien, whether the B V Property
includes the Disputed Property; (3) the correct amount of the "Original
Assessment" against the BV Property; (4) the correct amount of all amounts
currently owed to JSSD and the District pursuant to the Assessment Ordinance,
the Notice of Assessment Interest, and the assessment lien imposed thereby on the
BV Property; (5) whether all amounts claimed to be owed by JSSD and the
District have been accelerated, as claimed by JSSD and the District or whether
Plaintiffs can cure and reinstate any obligations owing to JSSD and the District.
(R. 1359-1360 atffi[154-157);
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(f)

Accounting, seeking an accounting which provides Plaintiffs with a

detailed, accurate and complete accounting of: (a) the proper amount of the
assessment principal owed to Defendants and precisely how the principal was
calculated; (b) the proper amount of any interest, late fees and/or attorneys' fees
owed to Defendants and the backup detail for all those claimed charges; and
(c) the proper amount of any cure amounts owed to Defendants. (R. 1357-1359 at
1H 158-167.)
44.

On August 31, 2010, the Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order.
(a)

During the hearing, counsel for the B V Entities stated that its title

company did not discover the Creation Resolution when it conducted a title
search.
(b)

Specifically, the following exchange occurred at the hearing:

"THE COURT: Before you lent $6.6 million on this property, surely BV
Lending would run a title report and see— . . .
MR. DIBBLE: Which they did. And this Exhibit 1 was . .. not on the title
report.
THE COURT: I'm showing it recorded—recorded February 17.
MR. DIBBLE: That was not on the title report, and we can put that as
evidence.... That was never part—never showed up on the title report that
BV Lending ran."
(R. 1979; Transcript from Hearing on Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
8/31/2010 at 97:6-25; 124:10-15.)
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45.

The Court granted the BV Entities' Motion on the grounds that the case

presents serious issues which should be the subject of further litigation and ordered the
BV Entities to post a security bond in the amount of $25,000.00 to be paid to the Court
by September 2, 2010. (R. 198-201.) In doing so, however, the Court noted that "there's
some dispute as to whether or not - the creation resolution appeared on a title report, but
there's no dispute that it was recorded. So plaintiffs may have a cause of action against a
title company or title insurer...." (R. 1979; Transcript at 124:10-15.)
I.

Immediately After Filing Its Complaint in State Court, BV Jordanelle
Declares Bankruptcy.
46.

On September 2, 2010, BV Jordanelle filed its voluntary petition for relief

under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Utah.
47.

On September 9, 2010, the BV Entities filed a Notice of Removal of Action

to Bankruptcy Court (R. 209-210) (in this case) and a Notice of Removal of Pending
State Court Action to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (in the
Bankruptcy Court), notifying the district court and parties that the case would be removed
to the Bankruptcy Court. (R. 221-222.)
48.

As a result of the bankruptcy filing, the district vacated the preliminary

injunction hearing, previously scheduled for October 4, 2010. (R. 224.)
49.

Defendants accepted service of the Complaint on September 15, 2010.

50.

On December 3, 2010, the parties submitted, and the Bankruptcy Court

entered, an Order of Abstention, and Transferring the Lawsuit to the Utah Fourth District
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Court for Wasatch County. In the Order, the Court stated "that portion of the Motion
which seeks dismissal of Plaintiff s claims shall be deferred for later consideration by the
State Court." (Stipulation, December 2, 2010 (R. 1511 at If 7A).) The Bankruptcy Court
noted that "[t]he State Court may in its discretion hear and decide that portion of the
Motion in which Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff s claims along with Plaintiffs
motion to amend and all other matters brought before the State Court by any party in the
Lawsuit." (Id at^7E.)
J.

District Court Grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the BV Entities' First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action and the BV Entities' Appeal.
51.

On February 16,2011, Defendants moved to dismiss all six of the B V

Entities' causes of action. Defendants argued that the Complaint should be dismissed
because the district court lacked jurisdiction and the BV Entities lacked standing to assert
their claims, including their constitutional claims. (R. 1757-1760.)
52.

On August 29, 2011, the Court entered the Order Granting In Part and

Denying In Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (R. 1886-1895.) The district court first
addressed the Defendants' jurisdictional argument and determined it had "jurisdiction to
hear and decide this case." (R. 1894.) The district court reasoned that Utah Code Ann.
§ 11-42-106 limits it's jurisdiction "to hear and decide claims alleging an 'error or
irregularity' in the assessment or the proceedings to levy an assessment." (Id.) However,
the district court concluded it did not "limit the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
challenging the constitutionality of the statutes notice provisions." (Id.) The court
reasoned that "[i]f the notice mandated by the statute falls below that which is
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constitutionally required by the due process clause, then the court has jurisdiction to hear
and decide that issue."6 (Id.)
53.

Having declared it had jurisdiction, the district court turned its attention to

standing and determined that neither BV Lending nor BV Jordanelle had standing to
pursue their first, second or third causes of action. The district court held BV Lending
lacked traditional standing because "B VL no longer has a security interest or ownership
interest in the [Encumbered Subject] property, having transferred ownership of the
property to BVJ in November, 2009." By divesting itself of any interest in the property,
"BVL eliminated any stake it may have had in the outcome of the[] proceedings and the
relief sought, especially since the assessment lien does not follow BVL as a personal
obligation." (R. 1892.)
54.

Likewise, the district court held BV Jordanelle lacked traditional standing

because it was not even established as an entity until October 29, 2009, and when "BVJ
acquired the property, the assessment ordinance, notice of assessment, and assessment
line were all matters of public record." (R. 1891.) Thus, "the adoption of the assessment
ordinance, notice of assessment, and assessment lien did not cause injury to BVJ's
interest in the property." (Id.) Further, the district court rejected the BV Entities' claim
that they collectively have the right to pursue their claims by concluding "BVJ cannot
litigate the rights of BVL in this action." (Id. (emphasis added).) The reason was

6

The district court further noted that Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-106 did not limit
it's jurisdiction to consider the BV Entities fourth, fifth or sixth causes of action. (Id.)
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because BV Lending "did not transfer to BVJ any interest in the First Note, Second Note
or Deed of Trust," due to BV Lending having "made a full credit bid at the trustee's
sale." Accordingly, no such interest remained to transfer. (Id.)
55.

The district court also held that the BV Entities lacked alternative standing.

Again, because BVL retained no "current interest," it has no stake in the outcome. The
district court held, "[t]o maintain standing to prosecute the claims in this case, a party
must retain some interest - whether a security interest or ownership interest - in the
property subject to the assessment ordinance." (R. 1890.) Focusing on the second aspect
of alternative standing, whether the case presents issues of sufficient public importance,
the district court concluded that while the case impacts the rights of private property
owners, "it does not present issues of sufficient public importance to balance the absence
of traditional standing criteria." (R. 1889.) Accordingly, it held BV Lending and BV
Jordanelle lacked alternative standing because unlike Grantsville, Cedar Mountain, and
Sierra Club, "a public interest of equal weight [was] not at stake here." (R. 1890.)
56.

On November 9, 2011, the district court granted the BV Entities' Motion

for Rule 54(b) Certification. (R. 1947-1949.)
57.

This appeal was then filed by the BV Entities on November 29, 2011.

(R. 1977-1978.)
58.

In the appellate brief, at paragraphs 35 and 36 (at pages xvi and xvii) the

BV Entities attempt to set forth the issues before the court and contend that if "[b]oth
BVL and BVJ were before the Court in the same action" and "do not have traditional
standing to sue ... then no one does." (Appellant's Brief at xvii.) These are not facts, but
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argument and ignore the undisputed fact that (1) BV Lending conveyed its interest in the
BV Property in November of 2009 and has no further financial obligation to pay the
assessment and (2) B V Jordanelle did not even exist when the Assessment Ordinance was
passed. The standing of BV Lending must be considered separate and apart from BV
Jordanelle and vice-versa.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rather than address the standing arguments that led to the dismissal of their
claims, the BV Entities characterize this case as a "deprivation of property rights without
due process of law" hoping the Court will overlook that the BV Entities lack standing to
pursue their constitutional claims. However, this case is not about the deprivation of
property rights. This case is not about a multi-million dollar assessment lien "prim[ing]
BVL's recorded interest." This case is not about the assessment lien rendering BV
Lending's recorded interest without economic value. To the contrary, this is a case in
which the BV Entities cannot and do not allege that Defendants acted in violation of the
Act. This is a case in which Wasatch County and the District strictly complied with the
four comers of the Act, including by providing notice. This is a case in which the owners
of the Aspens Parcel, among others, came to Wasatch County and requested it construct
$50 million in improvements, which the District did. This is a case in which BV Lending
on its own, openly and knowingly extended credit to PWJ Holdings without doing its
own due diligence. This is a case in which the BV Entities want the Court to correct its
own bad business deal. The Court should see through the BV Entities' fa?ade and affirm
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the district court's dismissal of the first, second, and third causes of action on the grounds
the BV Entities lack standing.
Throughout its brief, the BV Entities argue that since "the party that owned the
property at the time of the assessment and was harmed by the priming lien (BVL) and the
party that currently owns the property and must pay the assessment or risk foreclosure
(BVJ)," are both before the Court, they must somehow have standing to pursue their
claims. {See Appellant's Brief at 3, 5, 8, 9, and 10.) This generalization, however,
completely ignores the facts of this case and the law that applies to the creation of a
special improvement district, the constructing and installation of improvements, and the
adoption of the assessment lien against those who benefit directly from the
improvements. Here, there is no dispute that the owners of the Aspens Parcel, along with
the other owners within the District, have benefited substantially from the establishment
of the District. Without the sewer and water facilities, no development can occur.
However, the fundamental error in the B V Entities entire brief lies in the fact that
BV Lending relinquished, transferred and conveyed its interest in the BV Property
thereby removing any obligation to pay any portion of the assessment. As such, it has no
injury from the adoption of the Assessment Ordinance. Instead, it pawned off that
obligation to B V Jordanelle, an entity that was created after the Assessment Ordinance
was adopted by Wasatch County. Both parties acted with knowledge of the existence of
the Assessment Ordinance and notice of the assessment lien. Hence, they cannot be
heard to complain now.
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More importantly, when the Court evaluates the standing of each party separately,
as it must, the unyielding conclusion is that neither party has standing. To have standing
a party must: (i) assert that it has been or will be adversely affected by the challenged
actions; (ii) allege a causal relationship between the injury to the party, the challenged
actions and the relief requested; and (iii) seek relief that this substantially likely to redress
the injury. Here, on the one hand you have BV Lending who, although arguably harmed
by the priming of its security interest, elected to go forward with a trustee's sale,
extinguish its security interest, and convey its interest to BV Jordanelle. As the court
held, "BV Lending eliminated any stake it may have had in the outcome of these
proceedings, especially since it has no personal obligation to pay the assessment."
(R. 1892.) Similarly, since BV Jordanelle did not even exist when the assessment lien
was adopted and made a matter of public record, it is impossible for its due process
rights to have been violated.
ARGUMENT
The issue before this Court is straightforward: do the BV Entities have standing to
pursue their constitutional claims? The answer is no.
It is axiomatic that before a party may pursue a claim, the party must establish that
it has standing, which is determined at the time the action is brought. Nova Health Sys. v.
Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2005). Utah standing law "operates as gatekeeper
to the courthouse allowing only those cases that are fit for judicial review." Terracor v.
Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986). By limiting
cases, it ensures "that courts confine themselves to [the] resolution of those disputes most
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

effectively resolved through the judicial process." Id. at 799. Here, despite the
protestations that their constitutional rights to due process have been violated, the B V
Entities lack standing to pursue their claims and the district court properly dismissed the
first, second and third causes of action.
L

JUDGE PULLAN CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE BV ENTITIES
LACK TRADITIONAL STANDING.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a party does not have standing to challenge

a county's actions unless the party had an interest in the affected property at the time the
complaint was filed. Cedar Mountain Environmental Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT
48,fflf3-5, 214 P.3d 95 (emphasis added); see also Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149
(Utah 1983) ("The requirement that a plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of a
dispute is intended to confine the courts to a role consistent with the separation of
powers, and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts to those disputes which are most
efficiently and effectively resolved through the judicial process."). As discussed more
fully in Jenkins, there are two means by which a party may establish standing: (i) the
traditional test and (ii) the alternative test. Jenkins, 675 P. 2d at 1150-51. The traditional
test is referred to as the "distinct and palpable injury" test and requires the plaintiff to
allege that it has "suffered or will 'suffer[] some distinct or palpable injury that gives it a
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.'" Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah
Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, t 19, 143 P.23d 960 (citing Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148).
To determine whether a party has suffered a distinct and palpable injury, the Court
engages in a three step inquiry:
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First, the party must assert that it has or will be 'adversely affected
by the [challenged] actions.'
Second, the party must allege a causal relationship 'between the
injury to the party, the [challenged] actions and the relief requested.'
Third, the relief requested must be 'substantially likely to redress the
injury claimed.'
Id. "A person who satisfies the traditional test has standing and the court need not
inquire further." Id. at ^ 41. As demonstrated below, however, the district court ruled
that the BV Entities failed to demonstrate a distinct and palpable injury, thereby
determining the BV Entities lack standing to pursue their constitutional claims.
A.

BV Lending Lacks Traditional Standing Because It Does Not Own the
Property at Issue and Is Not Responsible for the Assessment.

A fundamental flaw in the BV Entities' standing argument is their refusal to
accept the undisputed facts of this case and their impact on standing. Although the BV
Entities would have this Court believe that the district court recognized it met the first
two elements of the traditional standing test, based on the undisputed facts and the district
court's ruling, BV Lending cannot meet three standing requirements. Specifically, the
district court found that BV Lending divested itself of any interest in the BV Property
when it conveyed the property to BV Jordanelle. (Statement of Facts ("SOF") If 53.)
Without any interest in the BV Property, BV Lending cannot claim it was adversely
affected by the adoption of the Assessment Ordinance. Nor can it claim a causal
relationship between the injury to BV Lending, the adoption of the Assessment
Ordinance and the relief requested - declaratory judgment. Finally, as the district court
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correctly ruled, B V Lending lacks traditional standing because it does not have a stake in
the outcome of the proceedings. (Id.)
One of the requirements for standing is that "the parties seeking relief must have a
legally protectable interest in the controversy" or a "personal stake in the outcome of a
dispute." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). BV Lending has neither.
Specifically, Judge Pullan held that:
BVL no longer has a security interest or ownership interest in the
property, having transferred ownership of the property to BV
Jordanelle in November 2009. By divesting itself of any interest in
the property, BVL eliminated any stake it may have had in the
outcome of these proceedings and the relief sought, especially since
the assessment lien does not follow BVL has a personal obligation."
(SOF f 53.) The BV Entities incorrectly state that Judge Pullan found BV Lending was
injured when the Assessment Ordinance was adopted without notice being provided to
BV Lending. (Appellate Brief at p. 4.) This is not accurate. The district court's ruling
merely accepted the allegations of BV Lending as it was required to do on a motion to
dismiss. Nonetheless, Judge Pullan went a step further and determined that regardless of
this fact, BV Lending lacks standing due to a lack of redressability. (SOF ^ 53.) Having
sold and conveyed its interest in the BV Property, BV Lending has no personal stake or a
legally protectable interest in the controversy. (Id.)
BV Lending admits it did not own the BV Property at the time it filed the
Complaint. (Id. at ^ 4.) Also, it is undisputed that BV Lending is not liable for the
assessment. Nor do Defendants seek to foreclose against any property owned by BV
Lending. Put simply, the outcome of this matter will not affect BV Lending in any way.
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Because of this, the relief that the BV Entities seek will not redress the alleged injury to
BV Lending. Therefore, BV Lending does not have traditional standing to bring this
lawsuit. See Cedar Mountain Environmental, Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48, \ 10,
214 P.3d 95, ("[W]e have determined that to have a personal stake in the outcome of a
land use decision, a party must own or occupy property within the jurisdiction of the
decision-making body."); Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592, 595, n.4 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (In ruling complaint was untimely, Court concluded that if plaintiff sold property
to third-party, the assessment lien would not follow the seller as a personal obligation.)
Nor can BV Lending attempt to prove standing by bootstrapping the standing
analysis to its due process claims. To argue that somehow it is afforded a more lenient
standard with respect to standing because it asserts procedural due process claims is of no
avail. None of the cases cited by BV Lending support their argument. The CopelinBrown and Carey cases stand for the proposition that a person's right to due process may
be actionable even when there are nominal damages. Copelin-Brown v. New Mexico
State Personnel Office, 399 F.3d 1248,1254 (10th Cir. 2005); Carey v. Phillips, 435 U.S.
247,266(1978). Here, BV Lending does not seek nominal damages. (SOFfl3.) It
seeks declaratory judgment from the Court that the notice requirements of the Act are
unconstitutional. (Id.) It seeks declaratory judgment to vacate the Assessment Ordinance
and excuse its lien obligations. (Id.) This far exceeds the nominal damages purportedly
allowed in the absence of actual injury, and justifies a heightened standing requirement.
This is particularly so where the Utah legislature has already determined that the
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appropriate parties to receive notice of a proposed assessment are the owners of the
property affected thereby. See Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-101 etseq.
Additionally, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992), has no
application here where the Court stated that the traditional standing requirements may be
loosened where, for example:
One living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a
federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing
agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even
though he cannot establish with certainty that the statement will
cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam
will not be completed for many years.
Id. An individual living next to a proposed dam cite is in a vastly different position than
a party who no longer owns the property at issue and has no obligations related to the
property.
The BV Entities' reliance on Electric Power Supply Association v. FERC is also
unfounded. 391 F.3d 1255, 1261-62 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In Electric Power Supply, EPSA
sought to participate in a FERC hearing pursuant to the Sunshine Act, but it did not have
any concrete or particularized harm to show it was currently aggrieved by the challenged
orders. Id. at 1262. The Court found that even though EPSA lacked financial interest,
because EPSA has a right, protected by the Sunshine Act's proscription against ex parte
communications, to "fair decision making" by the Commission, "[t]his, not the financial
interests of EPSA and its members, is the right directly protected by [the Act] and
impaired by the market monitor exemption." Id. Thus, standing was premised upon the
right to "fair decision making" provided by the Sunshine Act. Id. There is no analogous
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right conferred upon mortgagees here. Nor have the BV Entities alleged a lack of "fair
decision making." To the contrary, they claim their due process rights were violated
because they did not receive "actual notice" that the District was seeking to adopt the
Assessment Ordinance. (SOF ^ 43.) They do so in the face of admitting that Wasatch
County and the District gave the required notice under the Act and Utah law and that the
Creation Resolution (which expressly outlined the means and methods upon which the
assessment would be levied) was properly adopted and a matter of public record. (Id.
119.)
Similarly, Citizens for Better Forestry is distinguishable where the court expressly
held that the plaintiffs sustained an injury, and thus had standing: the "Citizens have
adequately alleged injury to their members. The interest at stake preventing
environmental damage to national forests and grasslands due to decreased regulatory
oversight are pertinent to the interests of environmental organizations such as Citizens."
Citizens for Better Forestry v. US Dept. ofAgriculture, 341 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir.
2003). Again, here, there is no plausible injury to BV Lending.
Accordingly, because BV Lending transferred and conveyed any and all right, title
and interest in the B V Property to B V Jordanelle and has no obligation to pay the
assessment, it lacks traditional standing to pursue any of the claims asserted in this case.
B.

BV Jordanelle Lacks Traditional Standing.

Bypassing the traditional standing test, the B V Entities attempt to bolster B V
Jordanelle's standing by claiming that if BV Lending does not have standing, BV
Jordanelle must. BV Jordanelle lacks standing because it, too, cannot demonstrate a
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"distinct and palpable injury." Sierra Club, 2006 UT at ^ 19. BV Jordanelle took title to
the BV Property subject to all encumbrances, liens, assessments and all the like, of which
it had actual or constructive notice at the time title was transferred. (SOF ^ 30); see
Brewer v. Peatross, 595 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah 1979) ("An encumbrance may be said to be
any right that a third person holds in land which constitutes a burden or limitation upon
the rights of the fee title holder."); see also Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-2 ("A recorded
document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission
in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment."). As such, Judge Pullan held:
BVJ lacks traditional standing. . . . BVJ was not formed until
October 29, 2009. Effective the same day, BVL transferred the
property to BVJ. On the day BVJ acquired the property, the
assessment ordinance, notice of assessment, and assessment lien
were all matters of public record. Therefore, the adoption of [those
documents'] did not cause injury to BVJ's interest in the property.
At the time of these events, BVJ did not even exist as a legal
entity.
(SOF Tf 54.) Therefore, BV Jordanelle does not have standing because it did not even
exist when the "challenged action" - the adoption of the Assessment Ordinance - became
effective. Not to mention, the Assessment Ordinance was a matter of public record when
BV Jordanelle took title to the BV Property. (Id. at ^ 30.)
Unlike the instant case, in which the District recorded the Creation Resolution, the
Brewer court affirmed judgment in favor of grantees for breach of warranty deed due to
the governing entities' failure to record the creation of improvement district. Brewer,
595 P.2d at 868. Indeed, BV Jordanelle took its interest in the BV Property over five
years after the Creation Resolution was recorded and months after the Assessment
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ordinance was passed. (SOF,ffif7-8, 27, 30.) It cannot now be heard to complain about
something that was decided years ago and which it knew, or should have known about.
See Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah 1990) (since challengers had
"sufficient notice of the creation of the district and of the proposed improvements,"
failure to file a copy of notice of intention did not render assessment void.).
The BV Entities' reliance on the third party standing doctrine, in which they argue
that BV Jordanelle should be permitted to assert the arguments of BV Lending, is
likewise misplaced. This argument was not made below, and thus should not be
considered by the Court. Regardless, the doctrine does not support the BV Entities'
argument. See e.g., Hodak v. City of St. Peters, 535 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 2008).
According to the very cases cited by the B V Entities, the third party standing doctrine
requires that the party on whose behalf the suit is brought lacks the ability to assert the
claim on his/her own. Id. at 904 ('"[a] party must show that some barrier or practical
obstacle . . . prevents or deters the third party from asserting his or her own interest.'"
(citing Benjamin v. Aroostook Medical Ctr., Inc., 57 F.3d 101, 106 (1st Cir. 1995)). The
court in Hodack stated "[n]o practical barriers exist if the third party actually asserts his
own rights." 535 F.3d at 904. Here, BV Jordanelle cannot assert the rights of BV
Lending under the third party standing doctrine because B V Lending is a party to the
lawsuit. Id. The doctrine simply does not apply.
The futility of BV Entities' third-party doctrine is further demonstrated by the
Tenth Circuit decision of Kemmerer Coal Company v. Brigham Young University, 723
F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983). In Kemmerer, the plaintiff sought to quiet title in certain coal
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deposits due to an assessor's mistake. Id. at 54-55. Kemmerer argued that its due
process rights were violated because its predecessor in interest, San Rafael Fuel
Company, did not receive notice of the tax assessment on the coal and received only
publication notice of the resultant sale of the coal rights. Id. at 56-57. In fact, the notice
erroneously listed strangers to the title as owners, although the Emery County records
clearly showed San Rafael to be the true owner of the assessed interest. Id. at 57. The
trial court found Kemmerer's due process rights were violated. Id. at 55-56. However,
on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and held that Kemmerer's due process rights were
not violated. Id. at 57-58. In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit held that it did not need to
decide whether Kemmerer's due process rights were violated "because Kemmerer itself
has suffered no due process injury." Id. at 57. Specifically, the Court explained its ruling
as follows:
If a constitutional violation occurred, it was the taking of San
Rafael's property without due process. Kemmerer thus seeks to
advance its claim by asserting a third-party's constitutional
rights. "[T]he general rule is that a iitigant may only assert
his own constitutional rights or immunities.'" McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961) [other citations omitted].
This rule has been applied to bar a grantee's assertion that its
grantor's due process rights were violated, [citations
omitted].
Id. (emphasis added (citations omitted)). As the grantee, BV Jordanelle cannot assert BV
Lending's (the grantor's) due process rights, if any, and vice versa.
Moreover, the BV Entities' often repeated assertion that if neither BV Lending nor
BV Jordanelle have standing, then no one does is simply wrong. The district court
rejected the BV Entities' claim that they collectively have the right to pursue their claims
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because "BVL divested itself of its interest in the property" and "BVJ cannot litigate the
rights of BVL in this action." (SOF ^ 54(emphasis added).) The reason was because
BV Lending "did not transfer to BVJ any interest in the First Note, Second Note or Deed
of Trust," because BV Lending "made a full credit bid at the trustee's sale." (Id.)
Accordingly, no such rights remained to transfer. But, there were others who had the
right to contest the Assessment Ordinance and chose not to do so.
The BV Entities also refuse to accept that the owners of the property at the time
the District was created and assessment ordinance adopted, including PWJ Holdings, had
standing to object. None of the owners objected. In fact, they all expressly requested
that the County create the District to provide the infrastructure for their projected
development plans. If BV Lending desired to protect its senior lien position, it certainly
had the ability to include a contractual provision in its loan documents to address this
very issue. It did not do so, and the County and JSSD complied with the Act, including
providing notice as required by the Act. (SOF % 19.) That PWJ Holdings later defaulted
on its loan obligation to B V Lending, and B V Lending chose to credit bid at the
foreclosure sale and take fee title interest in the BV Property subject to assessment is not
the fault of Defendants. (Id. atfflf23-25.) That was BV Lending's decision alone.
Further, prior to making the credit bid on October 29, 2009, BV Lending was on
notice of the assessment. (Id. atfflf13,19.) The following documents were a matter of
public record: Creation Resolution (2005), PWJ Bankruptcy proceedings (2009),
Assessment Ordinance (7/2009), and Notice of Assessment Interest (9/2009). (SOF,
fflf 7, 16-21.) Both BV Lending and its title insurer should have discovered the Creation
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Resolution when the loan was made and/or at least before B V Lending made the credit
bid and purchased the property at foreclosure sale. Counsel for the B V Entities admitted
that its title company did not notice the Creation Resolution when they ran the title
search. (Id. at ^ 44.) Therefore, the BV Entities' argument that no one has standing is
flawed.7
Finally, based on the Tholen decision, there is a strong public policy argument in
support of finality of decisions. 849 P.2d at 595 n.4. Once the District was created,
ordinance approved, and lien levied, disgruntled parties who took an interest in the
property after-the-fact cannot be heard to complain. This has to be the case even where
the claims are constitutional in nature. A property owner (B V Jordanelie) who, after the
fact, acquires the properly knowing the lien existed cannot be heard to complain and
lacks traditional standing. Id.; see also Henretty, 791 P.2d at 510.
G.

BV Jordanelie and BV Lending Do Not Satisfy the Policies Underlying
Traditional Standing.

Relying on Sierra Club, the B V Entities seem to suggest that the sole policy
consideration in determining traditional standing is to "avoid[] potentially poor advocacy
and avoid[] unnecessary decisions of constitutional issues." (Appellate Brief at p. 9.)
However, neither Sierra Club nor Utah law support such an assertion. Sierra Club
actually states that the traditional standing test "addresses whether the party has 'a real
7

The BV Entities' footnote five suggests that Judge Pullan stated if BV
Jordanelie transferred its interest in the property back to BV Lending, BV Lending would
have traditional standing. (Appellate brief at p. 10, n.5.) Judge Pullan made no such
statement or suggestion in its order and the record does not support this assertion.
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and personal interest in the dispute'" because such a party will "have the incentive to
' fully develop[] all of the material factual and legal issues in an effort to convince the
court that the relief requested will redress the claimed injury.'" Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74,
Tf 20 (citations omitted). These policy concerns are not met here. BV Jordanelle does not
have traditional standing because it did not exist at the time the District was created and
Assessment Ordinance adopted, so it is not able to "fully develop all of the material
fact[s]," particularly the facts at the beginning of the dispute related to the creation of the
District and establishment of the Ordinance. Id. Similarly, since BV Lending no longer
has an interest in the property and does not owe the assessment amounts, it is unable to
fully develop all material facts related to the current amounts due and owing pursuant to
the assessment lien.
The policy considerations noted by the Sierra Club court include whether the
courts should resolve questions best left to the other branches of the government. 2006
UT 74 at 1f 26. Arguably, the Court is not best positioned to address the BV Entities'
complaint because it challenges the constitutionality of the Act and the parties entitled to
notice under the Act. It is undisputed that JSSD provided notice to those entitled to it
under the Act. The Act does not require such notice be provided in writing to
mortgagees, and Wasatch County and the District complied with the statutory framework
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established by the Utah Legislature. (SOF ^ 19.) Thus, the BV Entities' complaints do
not involve JSSD, but rather the Legislature.
Even if the Court determines it is the appropriate venue for the BV Entities'
complaints, to deem the Act unconstitutional would undermine the very purpose of the
Act, which is to allow counties to establish special improvement districts for the benefit
of its citizenry. See Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Tholen,
a landowner filed a complaint more than five years after the Sandy City Council had
adopted an assessment ordinance and completed the promised improvements. Id. The
claims, which were brought after the landowner became delinquent on his payments,
challenged the initial assessment relating to the linear feet of frontage attributed to the
landowner. Id. In rejecting the landowner's declaratory judgment and motion for
injunctive relief, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that it would be "patently unfair to
force Sandy to start the assessment process over now, after it issued the requested bonds,
performed the improvements for the special service district, and reasonably relied on the
waiver and consent as well as the action - or more appropriately, inaction - of the
landowners in the district." Id. at 596.
*
8

Significantly, the Act itself provides that "each assessment levied ...
constitutes a lien against the property assessed" and is deemed to be "superior to the lien
of a trust deed, mortgage, ..., or other encumbrance" and is equal to and on a parity with
a lien for general property taxes." Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-501. Since the Legislature
has determined such liens are superior to mortgages and on par with general property
taxes, it has determined that notice to the property owners is sufficient. It is the owner
who ultimately benefits from the improvements, not the lender who in the ordinary
course expects its loan to be paid. And, if a lender wants to protect against circumstances
such as here, it can include contractual terms in its loan documents.
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Similarly, here we have a subsequent landowner attempting to use the United
States and Utah Constitutions to recast the Assessment Ordinance by suggesting that it
was entitled to notice and that the county's actions were arbitrary and capricious. Yet,
aside from notice, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations that either Wasatch County
or JSSD violated the Act. The BV Entities claim that had they received notice, they
would have challenged "the imposition of any assessment against the BV Property" and
the "method chosen by JSSD and the District for imposing the assessments in the first
place." (R. 1369 at ^[ 110.) Yet, the Assessment Ordinance is simply the last step in a
two step process. The decision to impose an assessment against the BV Property was
determined in 2005, long before the assessment lien came into existence. (SOF f 6.) BV
Lending was not a lender in 2005 when the County created the District, determined the
number of ERUs to be allocated among the Property owners (including PWJ Holdings)
and established the method to be used to impose the assessment. (Id.)
Furthermore, even though BV Lending may not have received actual notice, it was
on constructive notice that an Assessment Lien would be imposed against the B V
Property. First, the Creation Resolution was a matter of public record. (Id. at f 7.) BV
Lending admits either it or its title company did not locate the Creation Resolution in its
title search. (Id. at ^ 44.) Second, BV Lending was put on notice as part of the PWJ
Holdings bankruptcy. (Id. at 116.) Thus, to allow this case to proceed would be
"patently unfair" to the Defendants, who fulfilled their statutory obligations, established
the District over six (6) years ago, completed all of the improvements in the District,
relied on the lack of any objection from any of the landowners (or any other person)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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within the District when it was created in 2005, and now seeks to collect the assessments
to pay the bonds issued in accordance thereto. 849 P.2d at 596.
In short, the BV Entities fail to satisfy the traditional standing test or the policies
underlying the application of standing in this case. Neither party has a real or personal
interest in the dispute or any incentive to fully develop all of the material and factual
issues. The BV Entities' goal is merely to avoid or delay payment of an assessment lien
covering the costs of improvements that directly benefit the BV Property and, which
assessment has been due and owing since February, 2009. Thus, the Court should reject
the BV Entities'efforts.
II.

JUDGE PULLAN CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE BV ENTITIES
LACK ALTERNATIVE STANDING.
Without traditional standing, the B V Entities turn their attention to the alternative

standing test to argue the district court erred in not finding alternative standing. The
district court did not err.
In Jenkins, the Utah Supreme Court provided an alternative means by which a
party may prove standing "by showing that it is an appropriate party raising issues of
significant importance." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150; Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74 ^ 36. A
party meets this burden by demonstrating that it has "the interest necessary to effectively
assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions" and
that the issues are "unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing." Sierra Club,
2006 UT 74,136 (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150). "If the party is not an appropriate
party, the court's inquiry ends and standing is denied." 2006 UT 74, ^f 41. The second
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part of the alternative standing test requires the party to "demonstrate that the issue it
seeks to raise 'are of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to warrant
granting the party standing." Id, at ^ 39. As the Sierra Club court noted:
This requires the court to determine not only that the issues are of sufficient
weight but also that they are not more appropriately addressed by another
branch of government pursuant to the political process. The more
generalized the issues, the more likely they ought to be resolved in the
legislature or executive branches.
Id. Stated another way, if the court determines the party is an appropriate party, "the
court then considers whether the party is asserting issues of sufficient public importance
to balance the absence of the traditional standing criteria." Id. at ^ 41.
In this case, Judge Pullan noted that "[t]o maintain standing to prosecute the
claims in this case, a party must retain some interest - whether a security interest or
ownership interest - in the property subject to the assessment ordinance." (SOF ^ 55.)
As the district court correctly held, BV Lending had neither. (Id) Specifically, Judge
Pullan held because B V Lending retained no "current interest," it has no stake in the
outcome. (Id)
Even if BV Jordanelle were deemed an appropriate party to bring suit, the
alternative standing theory fails when the second requirement of public importance is
examined. The district court correctly concluded that while the case impacts the rights of
private property owners, "it does not present issues of sufficient public importance to
balance the absence of traditional standing criteria." (Id) The district court held BV
Lending and BV Jordanelle lacked alternative standing because unlike Grantsville, Cedar
Mountain, and Sierra Club, "a public interest of equal weight is not at stake here." (Id.)
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Actions are of significant public importance where they challenge industries that
pose potential environmental and health-related harms to citizens of a county, for
example the storage of hazardous waste. Cedar Mountain EnvtL, 2009 UT 4, ]f 17; see
also Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 42 ("Sierra Club and its members have an interest in
ensuring that the construction and operation of the plant comply with all applicable state
and federal environmental laws as well as with state administrative procedures."). Here,
the issue of whether mortgagees are entitled to notice under the Act is not one of
significant importance to the public, especially when the party seeking relief is not a
mortgagee, but a single property owner whose property was directly benefited by the
creation of a district and implementation of an assessment lien.9 Indeed, this is not an
action directed to either contest the creation of the District or an "error or irregularity in
an assessment... ." Utah Code Ann. § 11-42- 106(c). Instead, it is an attempt to avoid
foreclosure because B V Jordanelle does not want to pay a properly levied assessment,
despite the fact that its land has received substantial benefit from the public

Surely, if the issue of whether mortgagees are entitled to notice under the Act
were a matter of significant public importance, other land owners and mortgagees who
were allegedly harmed by the Act would have come forward to complain. In this case, it
was the property owners themselves who asked Wasatch County to create the District and
build the improvements. Although it may be of significant personal importance to the
property owners, it is not of "significant public importance." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74,
1139.
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improvements, constructed and installed with the consent of its borrower and every other
property owner within the District.1
In fact, the BV Entities' delay in filing this lawsuit demonstrates that this action is
not one of significant public importance, but one of personal importance only. The BV
Entities were on constructive, if not actual, notice of the District and Assessment
Ordinance when they took title to the BV Property. BV Jordanelle certainly was aware of
or should have been aware of the District and Assessment Ordinance when it received
title from BV Lending. (SOF ^ 30.) Even if the Court accepts that BV Jordanelle did not
learn about the assessment until January 2010, the BV Entities waited over eight months
to file this lawsuit in late August 2010, on the eve of the scheduled foreclosure sale. (Id.
at ^| 42.) If the BV Entities truly believed or claimed an "error or irregularity" with the
assessment, then they should have filed this action within days after learning of the
Assessment Ordinance. Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-106. This is not a matter of significant
public importance to justify alternative standing.
Reluctant to take the fatal requirement of public importance head on, the BV
Entities instead assert their constitutional claims are of sufficient weight and that the
judicial branch is best situated to address the claims. (Appellate brief at pp. 14-18.) The
BV Entities' arguments concerning their constitutional claims do not bear on the
alternative standing analysis. Just because the BV Entities believe their claims are
The public improvements were constructed and installed at a significant cost to
the District pursuant to a well established statutory framework set forth in the Act, which
was followed to the letter of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-101 et seq.
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"weighty" to them individually, does not give them alternative standing to pursue their
claims where the issues are not of significant public importance. This is particularly true
where the B V Entities are the only ones who have questioned the Assessment Ordinance,
albeit over a year after it became effective. The BV Entities merely claim that they were
entitled to notice under the Act and that they were deprived due process. (SOF ^ 43.)
This is an important distinction, because it shows that the issues do not truly impact land
owners and local governments in the entire state of Utah as asserted. (Appellate brief at
p. 15.) Nor will the resolution of issues in this case "have an impact on government
practices beyond the confines of the case itself." (Id.) To the contrary, this is a narrow
issue dealing with a single landowner who thinks it should have received notice.
The BV Entities' reliance on Mennonite Bd v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983) to
bolster their procedural due process claims is misplaced. Mennonite deals with the
different situation of a tax sale of property (not a tax lien) and stands for the principle that
a mortgagee is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax
sale because, under Indiana law, a mortgagee possesses a protected property interest that
is adversely affected by a tax sale. Id. This case does not involve a tax sale. It involves
an assessment lien. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. New Iberia, 921 F.2d 610, 614 (5th
Cir. 1991) (stating that "Mennonite in no way suggested [ ] that the taxing authority's
decision to levy taxes, which resulted in the unpaid assessment on the underlying
property, similarly affected the mortgagee or demanded adequate notice to the
mortgagee."). New Iberia, which has facts similar to those here, held there was no
constitutional claim of adequate notice where the property owner was not deprived of his
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property by the assessment of a special improvement lien. 921 F.2d at 616. The court
explained its ruling as follows:
Unlike the above-cited special assessment cases that made their
way to the Supreme Court, this one started with the landowners'
request to New Iberia for aid in improving their property. "When,
in such cases, government merely assists landowners in obtaining
money on favorable terms [because of its lower costs to make
public improvements], it does not thereby become responsible for
ensuring that the investment yields its expected benefits...."
Furey v. City of Sacramento, 780 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th
Cir. 1986). If, as in Furey, the owner-developers of Southport
Subdivision III were contesting the assessment after they
petitioned for the paving and sewage improvements, no
constitutional taking would be recognized. That the result
should differ in this scenario because a mortgagee makes the
claim is unthinkable. The mortgagee's interest in the property is
derivative from that of the owner. To allow the mortgagee to
assert an unconstitutional taking because of a special
assessment sought by the landowner would allow the
mortgagee potentially to receive whatever benefit did result
from the improvements without having to pay for them.
Moreover, this claim by the mortgagee would place an
impossible, if not absurd, burden upon the taxing authority: to
police the landowner's requests for assistance with improvements
so that his mortgagee will not be discomfited by the ensuing
special assessments. FDIC's implicit plea for governmental
paternalism in an area normally controlled by sophisticated
contractual relationships is as strange as it is unsupported by
precedent.
Id. at 615-16 (emphasis added). The BV Entities are seeking precisely the same
outcome: to receive all the benefits resulting from the improvements without having to
pay for them by relying on claims they have no standing to assert.
Finally, the BV Entities argue that the notice issue is best addressed by the judicial
branch and not by another branch of government. (Appellate brief at 17-18.) In
advancing this assertion, the B V Entities rely on the weighty assertion that this case
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

involves the deprivation of one's constitutional rights due to a lack of "actual" as opposed
to "constructive notice." However, due to the BV Entities' failure to "show[] a real and
personal interest in the dispute" because of BV Lending's divestiture of ownership in the
BV Property and BV Jordanelle's, after the fact, acquisition of the same, they cannot
"distinguish themselves from all citizens." See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150. As Judge
Pullan noted, "to the extent B VL seeks to require Defendants to create a new formula for
imposing assessments because of changed economic circumstances and expectations, that
is more appropriately addressed by a different branch of government—namely the county
legislative body." (R. 1889.) The Jenkins court recognized the dichotomy between the
various branches of the government:
To grant standing to a litigant, who cannot distinguish himself for all
citizens, would be a significant inroad on the representative form of
government, and cast the courts in the role of supervising the
coordinate branches of government. It would convert the judiciary
into an open forum for the resolution of political and ideological
disputes about the performance of government.
Id. (citing Bairdv. State, 51A P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978)). By this action, the BV Entities
seek to rewrite the Act. They seek to require notice when there has been a change in
economic circumstances. They seek to require notice to all mortgagees under the Act.
The Utah legislature has already determined who needs actual as opposed to constructive
notice. The Utah Legislature has already determined the procedure a governmental entity
must follow in creating a special improvement district and adopt an assessment lien.
Defendants followed this statutory framework in its entirety. If parties such as the BV
Entities want to change the law relating to who gets notice when a governmental entity
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creates an improvement district, constructs the improvements and adopts an assessment
ordinance, it is the legislature they should turn to for redress, not the courts.
III.

THE COURT MAY AFFIRM JUDGE PULLAN'S RULING FOR ANY
ALTERNATIVE BASIS,
A.

The BV Entities' Claims Are Barred Because They Failed to Contest
the Assessment Ordinance Within 30 Days After It Became Effective.

Although the BV Entities make much of their alleged standing to bring this suit, it
is important to note Utah's Assessment Act, codified at § 11-42 101 et seq. deprives a
party of standing to pursue a lawsuit if the party did not complain within thirty days after
the effective date of the Assessment Ordinance. Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-106. As the
Utah Supreme Court has noted in the past, an appellate court may sustain the judgment
on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record. See In re T.E., 2011 UT 51, Tf 36
("It is well settled that 'an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record."5). That is the case
here.
The Act provides that an action to contest an assessment or any proceeding to
designate an assessment area or levy an assessment "may not be commenced against and
a summons relating to the action may not be served on the local entity more than 30 days
after the effective date of the assessment resolution or ordinance or, in the case of an
amendment, the amended resolution or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-106(1),
(2)(b) (emphasis added). The Assessment Ordinance contains similar language. (SOF,
118.) The Act goes on to state that an "action under this section is the exclusive remedy
of a person who claims an error or irregularity in an assessment or in any proceeding to
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designate an assessment area or levy an assessment." Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-42-106(3)(a).
Finally, the Act provides that, "after the expiration of the 30-day period," the assessment
bonds "become at that time incontestable against all persons who have not commenced
an action. Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-42-106(5)(a). Additionally, after the expiration of the
thirty (30) day period, a "suit" to enjoin the "levy, collection, or enforcement of an
assessment or to attach or question in any way the legality of the assessment bonds, ... or
an assessment may not be commenced, and a court may not inquire into those
matters.11 Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-42-106(5)(b) (emphasis added). The BV Entities failed
to file a complaint within thirty (30) days after the effective date of the Assessment
Ordinance.

In fact, even after being informed of the Assessment Lien (whether as part

of the PWJ Bankruptcy Case or as they allege in January 2010), the BV Entities waited
almost eight more months until the eve of the scheduled foreclosure sale of the BV
Property, to assert their claims. Thus, the BV Entities' claims are barred because the
court lacked jurisdiction to "inquire into [these] matters." Utah Code Ann. § 11-42106(5).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decision of the district court
and dismiss this case, and all claims stated therein, with prejudice.
11

The Act also bars a court from hearing any "complaint that a person was
authorized to make but did not make in a protest under Section 11-42-203 or at a hearing
under Section 11-42-204." Utah Code Ann. § ll-42-203(b).
12

For BV Jordanelle, this would have been impossible since it did not even exist
when the Assessment Ordinance became effective. (SOF f 26.)
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